Edward Chang
Security, Middle East
The risk of miscalculation is now significantly higher.
The Real Threat to America: Iran May Close the Strait of Hormuz
President of Iran Hassan Rouhani threatened
to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to potential sanctions that
could be levied upon Iranian oil exports, threats which were echoed by
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). President Donald Trump has
given countries until November 4, 2018, to stop importing petroleum
from Iran. This wide-scale ban is part of a new campaign of
confrontation and pressure against the Islamic Republic. This demand
comes on the heels of the U.S. departure from the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, which was
signed in 2015.
During
negotiations, the JCPOA was marketed as the only option for curtailing
Iran’s nuclear program short of war. Supporters of the deal routinely
cited an increased risk of war in their arguments against exiting the
deal and Rouhani’s statement, on the surface, appears to confirm such
concerns. But how seriously should these threats be taken?
We’ve Been Here Before
Iran threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz is nothing new. In fact, as recently as 2012, the Obama administration
had its own confrontation with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program.
Iran threatened to close the Strait and carried out military exercises
in the area, drawing a major United States, British, and French
deployment in response. But a year later, both sides resorted to
negotiations that led to the JCPOA.
In
2008, citing fears of a U.S. or Israeli attack, the commander of the
IRGC, Mohammad Ali Jafari, threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in
retaliation. During the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War, both sides targeted one
another’s shipping as part of a total war effort, raising fears that
Iran might attempt to make the Strait of Hormuz unpassable. Iran used
mines as part of its strategy, eliciting an operation to safeguard
Kuwaiti shipping, codenamed Operation Earnest Will. Beginning in summer
1987, it lasted over a year-and-a-half and involved increasingly direct
combat between the United States and Iran, culminating in Operation
Praying Mantis in spring 1988. In the one-day air/naval battle, the
United States scored a decisive victory, with Iran losing several
warships during the exchange, while inflicting no losses in return.
Apart
from the events that took place from 1987–88, none of these incidents
resulted in open warfare. This is nothing short of remarkable, given the
unrelenting level of hostility exhibited on both sides since the
November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. While the lack
of actual fighting can be attributed to restraint and professional
crisis management skills on the part of the United States, it can also
be attributed to the fact that Iranian behavior and rhetoric regarding
the Strait primarily serves as a means of crisis-management (albeit a
dangerous one) and a political purpose.
Threatening Closure Is More Useful than Executing One
Eighty-five
percent of Iran’s imports come through the strait, and the oil exports
so crucial to the Iranian government’s solvency mostly flow out of it.
Iran would be cutting off its own lifeline if it closed the strait, and
it would have to live on its already dwindling currency reserves. Iran
would also be inviting attacks on its own oil facilities by vengeful
neighbors, and it would isolate itself internationally.
So,
in contemplating any Strait of Hormuz closure scenario, it should
immediately be noted such a move by Iran amounts to one of desperation,
employed only in a situation in which Tehran sees no other way out of
its predicament. Therefore, a Strait closure is unlikely, the United
States is well-aware of this, and the Iranian leadership probably
realizes Washington can call its bluff any time. So why does Tehran
continue to make such threats?
By
threatening to close the vital waterway linking the oil-rich Persian
Gulf with the world, through which approximately a third of the world’s
petroleum is ferried, Iran stokes fears of war and economic crisis. This
not only raises gas prices in anticipation of supply disruptions, but
it also influences world opinion towards the direction of de-escalation,
which would pressure the United States to back away from its own red
lines. Given the number of countries that rely on Middle Eastern oil,
including that of Iran, Tehran can craft a damning narrative that shows
that the United States is generating a crisis to the world’s detriment.
These
narratives work well at home, too. Like most autocracies, the Islamic
regime regularly employs crises to establish political dominance and
domestic order. The sights and sounds of Iranian naval forces
challenging and harassing U.S. warships serves powerfully as propaganda,
encouraging unity against the “Great Satan” that is America.
And
while the United States has the capability to prevent a closure or
re-open the Strait, the physical and political costs of such an
undertaking are considerable. Assuming Iran would attempt a closure only
when it feels it has no other recourse, it would then have little to
lose from doing so, while the United States and the world would bear
costs not easily recouped nor as readily borne in comparison.
What If Iran Were to Attempt a Strait Closure?
Iran’s
closure of the Strait would not involve employing its naval forces to
physically occupy the waterways in a conventional sense. Rather, it
would make the Strait impassable utilizing an Anti-Access/Area-Denial strategy
(A2/AD) strategy. For Iran, mines would form the centerpiece of this
strategy to turn the choke point into a no-go zone. Afterwards, it can
use land-based anti-ship missiles (ASMs) to prevent clearance operations
or to directly target enemy warships and civilian shipping. Should
Iranian leadership deem it necessary to deploy naval forces, the IRGC
possesses a large fleet of small fast-attack craft. Though lightly
armed, the craft can prove a menace to conventional warships, via the
use of “swarming” tactics to overwhelm adversaries and employ
“hit-and-run” attacks that are notoriously difficult to counter. On a
higher level, Iran could target United States and allied military
facilities in the region or even civilian population centers with
ballistic missiles as a means of deterrence.
The
ability of the United States and its allies to re-open the Strait of
Hormuz comes down to preparation. Should advance warning be received of
an impending closure attempt, the forces of Central Command (CENTCOM)
would mobilize and naval forces, particularly one or more aircraft
carrier strike groups would be rushed to region to force Iran to alter
its calculations or to intervene before it makes much progress in making
the waterways impassible. Should the United States and its allies be
caught off-guard, then the costs of re-opening the Strait could be
exorbitant.
For
example, Gay and Kemp estimated the cost of a Hormuz mine-clearance
operation to be $230.1 million. Even something as routine as maintaining
two carrier strike groups (CSGs) on-station for a week was estimated to
be $106 million. In the event of a more serious military confrontation,
a 2017 RAND report
calls for the deployment of, among other things, twenty-one Air Force
fighter squadrons and four CSGs. It is more difficult to estimate human
casualties, but these numbers make clear there are prohibitive up-front
costs to a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, whether a full-blown shooting
war erupts or not.
However,
for reasons outlined earlier, the likelihood of a surprise closure is
remarkably low. The United States and its allies are well-aware of such a
possibility and have been, for decades, well-prepared for the scenario.
The military superiority of the United States and its allies all but
ensures an overwhelming defeat for the Ayatollah’s warriors. Most
importantly, a surprise closure of the Strait acts to Iran’s detriment,
unless the strategic environment is such that Tehran feels its back is
against the wall and has little to lose from such desperation.
Threatening closure is more useful than attempting one, thus, absent
exigent circumstances, Iran’s leadership will always telegraph its
intentions, if only to avoid a situation where they must choose between
backing down and losing face or following through and hazard
overwhelming defeat.
Though risk of miscalculation remains, Iran has considerably dialed back
on its hostile behavior in the Strait, while increasing its aggressive
activities elsewhere. But if Tehran wants its threats to at least be
taken seriously, it may need to again resort to maritime provocations
against commercial shipping and the U.S. military. Iran’s de-emphasizing
of the Gulf in its strategy does not appear to be something that will
last much longer.
The Israeli Wild-Card
Some observers are predicting a cataclysmic war
between the Jewish state and Hezbollah in the near future. Given
Hezbollah serves as Iran’s most prominent proxy, there are concerns such
a conflict will draw Tehran in as well, risking a major regional
conflagration. Israel has, in fact, already clashed numerous times with
Iran-backed militias in Syria in
recent weeks and months, raising the likelihood of direct warfare between Jerusalem and Tehran.
Although
Washington does not possess a mutual-defense treaty with Jerusalem, the
former would still support the latter’s war effort through the
provision of armaments, logistics, intelligence support, among other
products. Furthermore, the United States currently has troops deployed
in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere throughout the region, along with
the ongoing air war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). In the event of a war between Israel and Hezbollah, potentially
including Iran, it would take incredible diplomatic and military
maneuvering to keep the United States directly out of the conflict.
The
true course of any conflict is difficult to predict, but Washington
should consider the possibility Iran may attempt to distract American
support for Israel by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. By
creating it crisis on the opposite end of the Middle East, Iran is not
so much banking on forcing the United States to reduce support for
Israel, but to overstretch its commitments, and create political and
strategic costs the American people may not be willing to bear, given
the generally controversial nature of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.
Once more, the importance of narratives emerges—threatening Strait
closure mounts pressure on the White House to find a diplomatic solution
to the conflict, due to the dread and uncertainty portending a
U.S.-Iran clash would conjure.
Once
again, however, blockading Hormuz proves an ineffective move if the
United States is willing to counter Iran’s provocations. This means Iran
is more likely to respond with low-intensity, deniable warfare by
utilizing cyberwarfare its deep roster of militias and terrorist groups.
Be it Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Gaza’s Hamas, or Iraq’s Popular Mobilization
Forces, the Ayatollah is likely to call upon these players long before
seriously considering closing the Strait of Hormuz. Hezbollah, in
particular, is among the most well-connected of terrorist groups in the
world, possessing links
with Central and South American drug cartels. A worst-case scenario
would involve Hezbollah exploiting these connections to carry out
terrorism on American soil. At the very least, it can be expected that
Iranian-backed militias like the PMU can be used to attack U.S. and
coalition forces in Iraq and Syria as the anti-ISIL campaign continues.
This would force the United States/coalition to contemplate escalating
their involvement in the multiple civil wars in the region, or, to their
obvious detriment, refrain from retaliation.
Conclusion
Barring
further developments, this latest threat from Tehran to close the
Strait of Hormuz will likely pass without incident. It will, however,
create the potential for close encounters between U.S. and Iranian naval
forces in the region, leaving open a window of heightened risk of
miscalculation. Furthermore, the likelihood of a war between Hezbollah
and possibly Iran continues to grow by the day. If or when that war
happens, the United States and the coalition will find it difficult to
stay out of the line of fire.
Edward Chang is a freelance defense, military, and foreign-policy writer. His writing has appeared in the National Interest and War Is Boring.
