https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-23/opec-supply-cut-target-stop-trying-to-guess-the-end
When will OPEC finally succeed in rebalancing the oil market? The second quarter? The fall? Next year?
As you ponder this question, keep this in mind: OPEC has moved on already.
Speaking
Tuesday on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Saudi
Arabia's energy minister, Khalid Al-Falih, said OPEC needed to extend
its cooperation with several non-OPEC producers on managing supply
"beyond the current agreement." As for Saudi Arabia's recently
established alliance with Russia, Al-Falih sees this lasting "decades
and generations."
Al-Falih was echoing comments he made last weekend in Muscat,
when -- apart from urging members of the so-called Vienna Group of OPEC
and non-OPEC members to consider cooperating beyond this year -- he
also raised questions about the target they should be pursuing. Right
now, it's the five-year average of commercial oil inventories in the
OECD. But, as he said, that's a dynamic target influenced by the very
glut OPEC seeks to eliminate (something I pointed out here). He held out the possibility that any extended agreement might target different levels of production or inventories.
The original six-month agreement announced in November 2016 has now been running for more than a year and was extended recently to the end of 2018. Now, though, there appears to be a new timescale: forever.
The reason for this was, coincidentally, laid out in a report
published earlier this month by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies
and authored by Spencer Dale, chief economist at BP Plc, and Bassam
Fattouh, a director at the OIES. They argue the current craze for timing
the peak of global oil demand misses the point because, even after this
happens, demand will likely fall slowly and the world will still
require millions of barrels a day for a long time to come.
Rather,
they argue that the prospect of peak demand reflects a shift from an
era of scarcity -- "peak supply" was the dominant view only a decade ago
-- to one of relative abundance as resources such as U.S. tight oil
have entered the market. Abundance of anything usually means heightened
competition for market share, and oil is no different. However, there's a
catch.
Several of the world's largest producers of oil, such as
Saudi Arabia, cannot embrace such a competitive paradigm fully. Although
they can produce oil from their fields for maybe $10 to $20 a barrel --
far below current prices around $70 -- they cannot sustain their
oil-rent-reliant societies for that price.
This is why Saudi Arabia is belatedly trying to refashion itself as a diversified economy.
Yet this is a long and risky process. So, in the meantime, they will do
what they can to keep oil prices high enough to cover the "social
costs" of being a petrostate, rather than simply compete for market
share. As Dale and Fattouh wrote:
It is likely that many low-cost producers will delay adopting a more competitive strategy until they have made significant progress in reforming their economies. This is likely to slow the speed at which the new competitive oil market emerges.
My quibble with this point is that, while
OPEC members will likely continue to fight against the competitive
trend, it is doubtful they can actually do this sustainably.
Clearly,
they've had some success over the past six months. Consider what that
has taken, though. First, OPEC couldn't do it alone; they had to rope in
11 other countries, including Russia. Second, as I wrote here,
a large share of the supply cuts delivered so far are due to some
countries, such as Venezuela, "over-delivering," to use Al-Falih's
uncomfortable euphemism. These, along with OPEC's thinly veiled appeals to U.S. shale operators to just dial it back already, are admissions of weakness rather than boasts of strength.
The
history of restrictive commodity agreements like OPEC's is largely one
of failure, punctuated by the occasional ability to keep prices far
above their marginal cost of production for several years. Keeping
prices high encourages rival supplies into the market (see the North Sea
in the 1970s and U.S. tight oil this past decade) and discourages
demand (see fuel-economy standards and nuclear power in the 1970s and
the push toward vehicle electrification
now). It's also hard to prevent cheating on supply quotas the longer
they remain and prices and circumstances change. On hearing Al-Falih's
comment about the alliance with Russia lasting "generations," my first
thought was that Russia in its present form has barely existed for one
generation.
In
the old days, an OPEC supply cut could keep prices high for years until
supply and demand responded to take them back. Nowadays, shale
producers rush to hedge
when oil rises above $50 a barrel, and thereby raise their output.
Demand, meanwhile, responds not just with knee-jerk reactions like
recessions but a gathering, structural change in the technology of
mobility that doesn't stop if prices fall again.
Saudi Arabia,
like several of its fellow OPEC members, feels compelled by its
vulnerable economic model to resist embracing a truly competitive oil
market and keep trying to manage the market well beyond 2018. Yet the
weaknesses of this approach are apparent already.
Looking ahead,
another sustained upswing in oil prices may well result less from some
coordinated effort but instead the chaotic removal of supply as some
weaker petrostates undergo wrenching changes à la Venezuela. The reality
is that the self-appointed guardians of "balance" in the oil market
constitute the very fragility lying at the heart of it.
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